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1. Introduction 
The observation that experts and lay people use cognitive shortcuts or heuristics to arrive at 
judgements about complex problems is certainly not new. But what is new is the finding that 
a group of reasoning strategies, which have been maligned by philosophers and logicians 
alike, have demonstrable value in helping members of the public come to judgement about 
public health problems. These problems, which span food safety crises, immunization scares 
and risks associated with exposure to environmental toxins, presuppose knowledge and 
expertise which falls outside of the epistemic and technical competence of most members of 
the public. Notwithstanding the complexity of these problems, they are not perceived by lay 
people to be wholly unintelligible or incomprehensible. This short communication reports on 
the findings of a questionnaire-based investigation into the use of these reasoning strategies 
by 879 members of the public. The results reveal a rational competence on the part of lay 
people which has been hitherto unexamined, and which may be usefully exploited in all 
aspects of public health work. 
 
This study extends earlier work which demonstrated extensive use of these same reasoning 
strategies by scientists who sat on expert advisory committees during the UK’s BSE epidemic.1 
These committees, which included the Southwood Working Party and the Spongiform 
Encephalopathy Advisory Committee, were charged with making assessments of the risks that 
BSE posed to human health. An almost consistent feature of the work of these committees 
was that scientists found themselves in the position of making judgements about the human 
health risks of BSE within very short time frames and often in advance of having access to the 
results of experimental and epidemiological studies. The epistemic context within which 
these scientists operated was thus one of pervasive uncertainty. Against this epistemic 
backdrop, it was demonstrated that scientists made use of a group of reasoning strategies to 
help guide them in their risk assessments. These strategies, it was argued, took the form of 
arguments which have occupied a somewhat inauspicious place in the long history of logic. 
Known as the informal fallacies, these arguments include such names as the argument from 
ignorance, question-begging or circular argument, and analogical argument. In Cummings 
(2010), it was argued that although these arguments have historically been viewed as forms 
of weak or bad reasoning, they actually have significant epistemic merits at the outset of a 
scientific inquiry. Specifically, these arguments were shown to facilitate the reasoning of BSE 
scientists by bridging gaps in their knowledge during risk assessments. To the extent that 
these arguments enabled scientists to circumvent uncertainty related to the lack of 
knowledge of this new disease, they functioned as effective mental shortcuts or cognitive 
heuristics.2 It was with the aim of establishing if these same arguments are also used by lay 
people, and for a similar purpose, that the current study was undertaken.  
 
2. Informal fallacies as cognitive heuristics 
In demonstration of the types of reasoning strategies examined in the current study, consider 
the following arguments: 
 
Argument A: 
There is no evidence that scrapie in sheep is transmissible to humans. 
Therefore, scrapie in sheep is not transmissible to humans. 
 
Argument B: 
BSE in cattle is similar to scrapie in sheep. 
Scrapie in sheep is not transmissible to humans. 
Therefore, BSE in cattle will not be transmissible to humans. 
 
Argument A is a classic argument from ignorance. In this informal fallacy, an arguer reasons 
from a lack of evidence or knowledge that P is the case to the conclusion that P is not the case 
(where P stands for a proposition, in this case ‘scrapie in sheep is transmissible to humans’). 
Similarly, an arguer may also reason from a lack of evidence or knowledge that P is not the 
case to the conclusion that P is the case. For much of the history of logic, logicians have tended 
to rail against the argument from ignorance on the grounds that a lack of evidence or 
knowledge should not be taken as proof that something is or is not the case. It is only in more 
recent logical analyses that philosophers have attempted to characterise the conditions under 
which this argument is rationally warranted.3,4 If a knowledge base in a particular domain is 
closed (epistemic closure) and has been exhaustively searched, and a proposition is found not 
to be contained within that base, then there are strong grounds for claiming that the 
proposition is false. Just such was the case in argument A. This argument was used by Brown 
et al. (1987) at the conclusion of a 15-year epidemiological investigation of CJD in France and 
following a review of world literature into the disease.5 Given that the knowledge base on CJD 
was closed after this lengthy period of investigation, and had been exhaustively searched by 
Brown and his colleagues, there were strong grounds indeed for claiming that if there was no 
evidence that scrapie was transmissible to humans then it was most likely not to be 
transmissible. This conclusion was particularly important as it was largely contemporaneous 
with the emergence of BSE in British cattle in 1986. Having recognized its strongly warranted 
status, scientists employed this conclusion extensively in BSE risk assessments, as can be seen 
from its inclusion as a premise in argument B. B is an analogical argument, another informal 
fallacy which was investigated in this study. This argument consists in an analogical premise 
that expresses a similarity or likeness between two entities A and B. A second premise states 
that A has property P, from which the reasoner derives the conclusion that B also has property 
P. The remaining two arguments investigated involve a reasoner arguing from a premise that 
is identical to the conclusion-to-be-proved (circular argument) and arguing from the expertise 
of an authority to the truth of the pronouncements of that authority (the argument from 
authority). 
 
The significance of these arguments is that when applied in certain contexts of use, they are 
not only valid forms of reasoning but they can also be facilitative of the wider scientific 
inquiries of which they are a part. This facilitation can take many forms such as warranting 
decisions to take public health measures (the introduction of the human Specified Bovine 
Offal ban in the case of BSE) or to implement a certain program of research. It is this important 
function of these arguments that warrants their description as cognitive heuristics. For the 
most part, BSE scientists were successful at recognising the contexts under which these 
arguments were valid (although, as it was argued in Cummings (2010), they also made some 
frightful errors in this regard). A question of some import that is addressed by the current 
study is whether the lay person is similarly equipped to recognise these contexts. 
 
3. Public health reasoning and the lay person 
The principal aim of this study was to establish if members of the public could identify the 
epistemic and logical conditions under which four informal fallacies were more or less 
rationally warranted during deliberations about public health problems. A total of 879 
subjects participated in the study. These subjects included 292 men and 587 women aged 
between 18 and 65 years. Subjects were of diverse educational and ethnic backgrounds (see 
Table 1). They were enrolled in the study during a series of formal recruitment activities which 
were conducted in public venues (e.g. health clubs, foyers of hospitals) across the East 
Midlands region of England. The fallacies selected for study were the argument from 
ignorance, circular argument, analogical argument and the argument from authority. These 
fallacies were presented to subjects in paragraph-length scenarios in an anonymous 
questionnaire which could be completed in 30-40 minutes. Each subject received eight 
scenarios which included examples of all four argument types. Of the four questions that 
followed each passage, two required short responses and were designed to test subjects’ 
understanding of explicit information in the passage. The aim of these questions was to create 
the impression on the part of subjects that they were engaging in a reading comprehension 
task rather than a reasoning experiment. A third question aimed to establish if subjects had 
drawn a particular inference. This was typically indicated by a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ response, or a 
response that required subjects to circle one of the following: valid; moderately valid; not 
valid at all. A fourth question was open-ended and encouraged subjects to expand on the 
logical grounds for an inference. Logical and epistemic conditions (e.g. epistemic closure) 
were systematically varied across the 24 scenarios in the study (see Table 2). All scenarios 
were scrutinised by two public health consultants in advance of the study and were judged to 
have a high degree of plausibility.  
 
Quantitative data from the current study were analysed using the Statistical Package for the 
Social Sciences (SPSS for Windows Version 18.0). Because the data in this study is categorical, 
non-parametric statistical tests were used. SPSS provides a Pearson chi-square test for 
significance testing. Detailed results are reported elsewhere.6 However, it should be noted 
that several significant Pearson chi-square values were obtained. For example, in relation to 
the argument from ignorance, there was a significant difference (p < 0.05) in the number of 
respondents who accepted ignorance inferences under conditions of complete epistemic 
closure and exhaustive search in comparison with conditions in which there was incomplete 
epistemic closure of a knowledge base and limited search of the base. Alongside other 
findings of this type, it is clear that certain epistemic and logical conditions hold rational sway 
with lay subjects in much the same way that they did for expert scientists during the BSE 
epidemic. As well as providing support for the claim that lay subjects are able to discern the 
conditions under which informal fallacies are more or less rationally warranted during public 
health deliberations, these findings have potentially valuable practical applications to public 
health. The findings of this study suggest that we can be reasonably confident about the 
prospects of developing this rational capacity on the part of the public through a range of 
educational efforts: people can be trained to be critical thinkers. This confidence is in stark 
contrast to the view of ‘many researchers [who] think that attempts to improve decision-
making through education […] lie somewhere between over-optimistic and hopeless’.7 A fully 
developed rational capacity can then be exploited by public health agencies to achieve greater 
compliance of populations with a range of health measures, and better public understanding 
of vital health communications. 
 
 
  
          SUBJECT CHARACTERISTICS 
 
     AGE 
 
   Average: 43.8 years 
   Range: 18-65 years 
 
   GENDER 
 
   Male: 292 subjects 
   Female: 587 subjects 
 
 EDUCATION 
    
 
   University level: 589 subjects 
   Secondary school level: 290 subjects 
   ETHNICITY 
 
   White British: 789 subjects 
   White Irish: 30 subjects 
   Asian or British Asian Indian: 15 subjects 
   Asian or British Asian Pakistani: 4 subjects 
   Black or Black British Caribbean: 3 subjects 
   Black or Black British African: 3 subjects 
   Mixed: White and Black Caribbean: 1 subject 
   Mixed: White and Black African: 1 subject 
   Mixed: White and Asian: 1 subject 
   Other: 32 subjects  
  
Table 1: Subject characteristics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                Description of public health scenario 
  
 
  1 
 
  2 
 
  3 
 
  4 
 
ARGUMENT FROM AUTHORITY 
Genuine, impartial expertise; actual scenario: 
Pronouncements on BSE by the Spongiform Encephalopathy Advisory Committee 
Genuine, impartial expertise; non-actual scenario: 
Use of chemicals in food production 
Genuine, partial expertise; actual scenario: 
Aspirin use and Reye’s syndrome in children 
Genuine, partial expertise; non-actual scenario: 
   5 
 
  6 
 
   7 
 
  8 
 
 
 
  9 
 
  10 
 
  11 
 
  12 
 
  13 
 
  14 
 
Cancer risks posed by a nuclear power facility 
Dubious, partial expertise; actual scenario: 
Safety of the measles, mumps and rubella (MMR) vaccine 
Dubious, partial expertise; non-actual scenario: 
Electromagnetic emissions from mobile phone masts 
Dubious, impartial expertise; actual scenario: 
Pronouncements on BSE by the Southwood Working Party 
Dubious, impartial expertise; non-actual scenario: 
Air-borne chemical emissions from a recycling facility 
 
ARGUMENT FROM IGNORANCE 
Full closure; exhaustive search; actual scenario: 
Risk assessment of the transmissibility of scrapie to humans 
Full closure; exhaustive search; non-actual scenario: 
Assessment of findings from clinical trials of a new asthma drug 
Incomplete closure; limited search; actual scenario: 
Risk assessment of the transmissibility of BSE to humans 
Incomplete closure; limited search; non-actual scenario: 
Health risks associated with chemicals in effluent from a pharmaceutical plant 
Full closure; limited search; actual scenario: 
Assessment of the safety of genetically modified foods 
Full closure; limited search; non-actual scenario: 
Assessment of the safety of a food additive in dairy products 
  15 
 
  16 
 
 
 
  17 
 
  18 
 
  19 
 
  20 
 
 
 
  21 
 
  22 
 
  23 
 
  24 
Incomplete closure; exhaustive search; actual scenario: 
Safety of swine flu immunization 
Incomplete closure; exhaustive search; non-actual scenario: 
Location of the source of an outbreak of severe food poisoning 
 
ANALOGICAL ARGUMENT 
Strong analogy; actual scenario: 
The use of hepatitis B by the CDC in the US as a model for HIV/AIDS health advice 
Strong analogy; non-actual scenario: 
Investigation by epidemiologists of illness related to chemicals in drinking water 
Weak analogy; actual scenario: 
Use of scrapie by British scientists to assess the risk of BSE to human health 
Weak analogy; non-actual scenario: 
A study by epidemiologists of the health effects of a new arthritis drug 
 
CIRCULAR ARGUMENT 
Positive outcome; non-actual scenario: 
Investigation of fever in patients following vaccination for pneumonia 
Lack of evidence; non-actual scenario: 
Investigation of a disease outbreak in the Congo by scientists from WHO 
Negative outcome; non-actual scenario: 
Study of a purported link between electromagnetic radiation and birth defects 
Abundant evidence; non-actual scenario: 
 Discovery of a novel disease by medical anthropologists working in Peru 
 
 
Table 2: Public health scenarios 
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